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Introduction
Ukraine’s western borders are inherited from the So-
viet Union. They were formed as a result of the Soviet vic-
tory in the Second World War and the annexation of part 
of the territory of Poland, Romania, Hungary. The mili-
tary and political power of the Soviet Union was the guar-
antor of the inviolability of its borders. After Ukraine 
gained independence, the political forces calling for re-
venge rapidly intensified their activity in the neighbor-
ing countries. These political forces have representation 
in parliament as well as influence on the formation of 
foreign policy of these countries. Their activity triggered 
the emergence of a number of disputes in Ukraine’s bilin-
gual relations with the above mentioned states. Some of 
these disputes (for instance, Snake Island Dispute) were 
a subject of resolution in the International Court of Jus-
tice. Other imbroglios are still smoldering having a po-
tential to turn into a real conflict with the painful conse-
quences for Ukraine’s integrity. 
Territorial claims of Romania
Snake island Dispute
The continental shelf around Snake Island is a subject 
of conflict that was brought before the International Court 
of Justice. The roots of the conflict go back to the XX cen-
tury. According to the Peace Treaties of 1918 and 1920 af-
ter World War I Snake Island was considered a part of Ro-
mania. There was no mention about it in any peace treaties 
after World War II. In 1948 Soviet troops occupied Snake 
island and moved the Romanian boundary in the Danube 
Delta towards the west in favor of the USSR, that was 
strongly disputed by Romania. After 1991 Ukraine took 
control over the island, although Romania consistently 
claimed it should be included in its territory. The 1997 ba-
sic treaty concluded by the two countries stipulates that 
negotiations on the shelf’s delimitation will continue and, 
if no agreement is reached, the sides will be able to appeal 
to the International Court of Justice in The Hague as a last 
resort.Ukraine agreed under that treaty to deploy no «ag-
gressive weapons» on Snake Island, and, more important-
ly, to consider it «uninhabited» [3, p. 335]. 
But several years later 10 million tones of oil and 
natural gas were discovered under the seabed nearby. 
BP and Royal Dutch/Shell signed prospect contracts 
with Ukraine, while Total with Romania.And that was 
the period when the policy of both Ukraine and Romania 
towards Snake Island changed rapidly. Both countries 
became interested in this territory and did their best in 
order to obtain it.
Romania’s position was that Snake Island should be 
defined only as a rocky outcropping, and therefore need 
not be considered important enough to be a factor in 
drawing the Romanian-Ukrainian maritime border. 
Ukraine’s position was that Snake Island should be 
defined as an island, as its name suggests, which would 
mean that the continental shelf around it would fall to 
Ukraine’s possession. That’s why Ukraine refused from 
its obligation taken in 1997 (to remain it uninhabited) but 
started to resettle people there, regularly transported wa-
ter to it, and launched a ship to provide regular service 
between the mainland and the island. The island was sup-
plied with navigation equipment, including a 150-year 
old lighthouse. Electric power was provided by a dual 
wind/diesel power station. The island also had such civil 
infrastructure as a post office, a bank branch (of Ukrain-
ian bank «Aval»), a first-aid station, satellite television, 
a phone network, a cell phone tower, and an Internet link.
More than 20 rounds of negotiation meetings con-
ducted thus far between Bucharest and Kyiv produced no 
results. On 16 September 2004, Romania brought a case 
against Ukraine before the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) relating to a dispute concerning the establishment 
of a single maritime boundary between the two states in 
the Black Sea, thereby delimiting the continental shelf 
and the exclusive economic zones (EEZ) appertaining to 
them. Romania requested the ICJ to draw the boundary 
in accordance with international law.
On February 3, 2009 the Court also reached the con-
clusion that Snake Island should be disregarded in draw-
ing the provisional equidistance line. In this case, the 
Court indicated that its decision was mostly based on the 
fact that Snake Island could not be considered to form 
part of «the coast» of Ukraine, in view of the consider-
able distance between the island and the mainland coast. 
As a consequence: 
To count Snake Island as a relevant part of the coast 
would amount to grafting extraneous element onto 
Ukraine’s coastline; the consequence would be a judicial 
re-fashioning off geography, which neither the law now 
practice of maritime delimitation authorizes (para. 149) [1].
As a result Romania received almost 80 percent of 
disputed maritime domain in the Black Sea which has in-
creased its continental shelf in a region rich in oil and gas 
reserves. 
The conflict over the use of Danube Delta
The dispute over the use of the transport potential of 
theDanube Delta has further deteriorated the relations 
between Romania and Ukraine. In 2004 the Ukrainian 
government began developing the Danube-Black Sea deep 
water navigation route in the Ukrainian part of the Dan-
ube Delta on the Bystroye canal [8]. The objective of this 
project, which connects the Danube’s Kilia arm with the 
Black Sea, is to increase the volume of goods transported 
via Ukrainian ports on the Danube. The Ukrainian project, 
which claims to offer a higher capacity, two-way traffic 
and lower fees for ships, represents a direct challenge to 
Romania’s monopoly of goods transported on the Danube 
Delta and an economic threat to Romania’s canal built fur-
ther upstream which links the Danube to the Black Sea. 
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Estimates suggests that Romania might lose up to 1,5 
million dollars annually as international shipping could 
use the alternative cheaper Ukrainian route to the Sulina 
branch of Danube River Delta. Romania claimed, that the 
Ukraine’s canal was threatening the unique eco-system of 
the Danube Delta. In 2008, Bucharest decided to take the 
dispute with Ukraine outside bilateral relations and put 
it on the agenda of the Espoo Convention Implementation 
Committee (which evaluates the impact on the natural en-
vironment in the cross-border context) and of the EU coun-
cil of ministers for the environment in order to cause these 
bodies recommend Ukraine cease work on the development 
of the channel. As a result of Bucharest’s allegations the 
further development of the Bystroye canal has been tem-
porally blocked [10, p. 24]. 
Maikan Island isanother disputable territory, which 
belongs to Ukraine. It is situated on the Danube, where the 
current of the river was agreed to set the Ukrainian-Ro-
manian border. However, as a consequence of a natural 
change in the trajectory of the current to Ukraine’s dis-
advantage, the island is now located on the Romanian side 
of the border, and Bucharest is insisting that Kyiv should 
relinquish its rights to this island [8].
The Conflict over Southern Bessarabia and Northern 
Bukovina
Since the collapse of the USSR and the emergence of 
an independent Ukraine Romanian politicians have on nu-
merous occasions called into question the legality of the 
change of the Romanian-Soviet border in 1940, as a con-
sequence of which Bessarabia (now the Republic of Moldo-
va), Southern Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina on the 
Black Sea, which had belonged to the Kingdom of Roma-
nia, became part of the USSR.
In May 2010, President Basescu thus stated: «Kiev 
should not forget about the return of Southern Bessarabia 
and Northern Bukovina, territories which the former USSR 
annexed from Romania after the Second World War.»
 In January 2006, Basescu had declared that «the mini-
mal policy of Romania is for the unification of the Romani-
an nation to take place within the EU.» The notion »mini-
mal policy» assumes the existence of a maximal policy that 
presumably goes way beyond mere unification with Moldo-
va. The reality of the project is apparent in the decision to 
grant Romanian citizenship to all residents of the territo-
ries belongingto the pre-1940 Greater Romania and their 
descendants, up to the third generation including the den-
izens of Bukovina (Chernovtsy) and southern Bessarabia 
(Budjak) [11].
The official justification for facilitated access to cit-
izenship for persons who have lost Romanian citizenship 
«against their will or for other reasons not imputably to 
them» is mainly framed in the language of justice. The 
post-communist state assumed the duty to restore Ro-
manian citizenship, albeit upon individual request, to all 
those who had been unjustly deprived of citizenship sta-
tus. In this context TraianBasescu stated that It is not citi-
zen Dumitrescu from [the Moldovan city of] Cahul who has 
decided to lose his [Romanian] nationality, it’s Stalin who 
has decided for him [6, p. 339].
Any conflict between Ukraine and Romania might jeop-
ardize not only the revision of border between two States. 
Both Ukraine and Romania are objects of geopolitical in-
fluence of more powerful players. Therefore, the Ukrain-
ian-Romanian conflict can be deliberately used as an ele-
ment of destabilization of the situation in South-Eastern 
Europe with inevitable engagement of Russia and the 
European Union. That is why Ukraine should review its 
policy towards Romania and build it on the basis of the fol-
lowing steps:
1. Preservation of Moldova as a buffer between Ukraine 
and Romania. The viability of Moldova in the long run will 
determine the level of conflict in relations between Kiev 
and Bucharest. The disappearance of Moldova from the po-
litical map of the world automatically transfers the motion 
vector of Romania to Ukraine. 
2. Ukraine should strengthen its position in Transn-
istria , as in the case of Romania’s absorption of Moldo-
va Transnistria becomes the last buffer which separates 
Ukraine and Romania.
3. The development of economic projects in the region 
will integrate the countries of South-Eastern Europe, thus 
reducing the level of conflict.
Territorial Claims of Hungary
Transcarpathia is a region that has been a part of nu-
merous territorial transfers and occupations in the 20th 
century, and comprises of large ethnic populations of 
Hungarians, Rusyns, Romanians and other minorities. 
Historically an integral part of the Kingdom of Hungary, 
Transcarpathia was annexed by Czechoslovakia in 1920 as 
a result of the post-WWI Treaty of Trianon which denied 
the principles of self-determination or a plebiscite for Hun-
garian minorities. The region was awarded to Hungary in 
1939; and was then ultimately transferred to what was 
then Soviet Ukraine in 1945. Notwithstanding the regions 
tangled history, the ethnic composition of Transcarpathia 
has withstood decades of attempts at forced assimilation 
and discriminatory practices by governments in Prague, 
Moscow and Kiev; but has largely retained its 150-160,000 
strong Hungarian minority in pocket communities along 
the Ukraine-Hungary border [5].
The Hungarian government placed considerable dip-
lomatic and public pressure on Ukraine to protect its 
minority populations. According to the new Hungarian 
Constitution «Hungary shall bear responsibility for the 
fate of Hungarians living beyond its borders, and shall 
facilitate the survival and development of their com-
munities; it shall support their efforts to preserve their 
Hungarian identity, the assertion of their individual 
and collective rights, the establishment of their com-
munity self-governments, and their prosperity in their 
native lands, and shall promote their cooperation with 
each other and with Hungary» [2].
In a speech on March 4, 2014 Hungarian Prime Min-
ister Viktor Orban – whose government has made a cor-
nerstone of its policy the protection of Hungarian mi-
norities – criticized a decision of the new government of 
Ukraine to repeal the 2012 law «On the principles of the 
state language policy» which granted the minority lan-
guage the status of a regional language approving its use 
in courts, schools and other government institutions in 
areas of Ukraine where the percentage of representatives 
of national minorities exceeds 10% of the total popula-
tion of a defined administrative district. Passage of the 
repeal bill was met with regret by Hungary who considers 
it as a tool to suppress minority groups in Ukraine. Vik-
tor Orban expressed Hungary’s objection to the abolition 
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of the Ukrainian language law as illegitimate and unac-
ceptable. Subsequent policy remarks by Orban advocating 
autonomy as an option for Hungarian minorities aggra-
vated Ukrainian officials who had been already hesitant 
towards Hungary’s liberal citizenship policy towards 
Hungarian minorities in neighboring states.
Currently the radical nationalist Jobbik party has 
demanded that full territorial autonomy be granted to 
the Hungarian and Ruthenian minorities in Transcar-
pathia It is a reminder that the West, having failed to 
stop Russia’s «territorial» adjustments in Georgia in 
2008 or in Ukraine in 2014, has opened the door not only 
to Vladimir Putin but to other leaders around the world 
who may decide that the era of fixed borders is over and 
that they have everything to gain by seeking to expand 
their own.
Territorial claims of Poland
KresyWschodnie or Kresy («Eastern Borderlands», 
or «Borderlands») is a term that refers to the eastern 
lands that formerly belonged to Poland. These territories 
today lie in western Ukraine, western Belarus, as well as 
eastern Lithuania.
In the interbellum, the term Kresy roughly equated 
with the lands beyond the Curson line, suggested in De-
cember 1919 by the British Foreign Office as the eastern 
border for Poland. After the 1919–1921 war between Po-
land and the Soviet Russia Kresy became Polish. In Sep-
tember 1939, these territories were incorporated into the 
Soviet Union. Even though Kresy, or the Eastern Border-
lands, are no longer Polish territories, the area is still in-
habited by a significant Polish minority, and the memory 
of a Polish Kresy is still cultivated. 
In 2014 Poles in the Zhitomir Region demand to form 
autonomy with broad self-governance rights on the ter-
ritory of Ukraine. According to the statements made 
by some representatives of that ethnic minority, «over 
the last decades they have been going through difficult 
times being prosecuted and discriminated against by the 
Ukrainian authorities». The radical nationalist party of 
RuchNarodowy together with the Hungarian Jobbik Par-
ty has published a joint statement demanding autonomy 
for the Poles and Hungarians living on the territory of 
Ukraine [7].
The attachment to the «myth of Kresy», the vision of 
the region as a peaceful, idyllic, rural land, has been an 
issue in Polish public discourse. «Restitution Kresy», a 
recently established organization, was created in 2015 
to deal with the return of Polish property in the Western 
Ukraine. The organization brings together heirs of for-
mer owners of property nationalized in 1939-40. With a 
corresponding database at their disposal they are organ-
izing a group of lawyers to prepare legal actions. The or-
ganization wants to return the property to heirs in case 
they produce evidence to go upon and prove themselves 
rightful owners.
It could be ignored, but the issue of «eastern Polish 
borderlands» (Polish Ukraine) is not only a public dis-
course. Polish schools and vocational colleges run a spe-
cial course on «eastern borderlands». The students are 
invited to discuss the topics like «The days of territories’ 
culture», «Guests from Ukraine», «Let’s save Polish 
graves in Ukraine», «Meeting those who love the terri-
tories» etc [9]. 
Implications for Europe: the formation of aspirations 
to change existing borders in Eastern Europe in places of 
compact residence of national minorities in the west of 
Ukraine.
Conclusion
Being a new and important space on the Eurasian 
chessboard, Ukraine has a strong human potential, con-
siderable opportunities to develop in industrial and ag-
ricultural spheres, as well as a favorable geographical 
position. Zbigniew Brzezinski famously argued that 
«Ukraine plays the role of a critically important geopolit-
ical pivot» [4, p.46], that requires all geopolitical centers 
of power to pursue a balanced and rational approach to-
wards Ukraine. United Europe should be no exception. 
European decision-makers need a better understand-
ing of historical peculiarities of Ukraine’s development 
and its place in the regional political and socio-economic 
processes, as well as its ethnic and linguistic diversity. 
Such an approach will contribute to the genuinely ration-
al foreign policy carried out towards the whole region and 
particular states, promotion of the interests of European 
investors, protection of human rights and freedoms, and 
the security and strengthening of democracy on the Eu-
ropean continent. 
European politicians and representatives of the ex-
pert community must recognize the seriousness of a 
whole range of external threats to Ukraine. Such an ap-
proach will stop their spread as well as contribute to the 
development of mechanisms and measures to prevent fur-
ther disintegration of Ukraine and creation of new zones 
of instability in Eastern Europe.
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